1 files changed, 267 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/freebsd/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c b/freebsd/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1bcf356a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/freebsd/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+#include <machine/rtems-bsd-kernel-space.h>
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2019 iXsystems Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/endian.h>
+#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h>
+#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h>
+
+/*
+ * Given two CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN blocks, xor
+ * them into dst, and then encrypt dst.
+ */
+static void
+xor_and_encrypt(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx,
+		const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst)
+{
+	const uint64_t *b1;
+	uint64_t *b2;
+	uint64_t temp_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t)];
+
+	b1 = (const uint64_t*)src;
+	b2 = (uint64_t*)dst;
+
+	for (size_t count = 0;
+	     count < CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t);
+	     count++) {
+		temp_block[count] = b1[count] ^ b2[count];
+	}
+	rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, (void*)temp_block, dst);
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Init(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *key, uint16_t klen)
+{
+	ctx->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->keysched, key, klen * 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to set the nonce, aka IV.
+ * Before this call, the authDataLength and cryptDataLength fields
+ * MUST have been set.  Sadly, there's no way to return an error.
+ *
+ * The CBC-MAC algorithm requires that the first block contain the
+ * nonce, as well as information about the sizes and lengths involved.
+ */
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *nonce, uint16_t nonceLen)
+{
+	uint8_t b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+	uint8_t *bp = b0, flags = 0;
+	uint8_t L = 0;
+	uint64_t dataLength = ctx->cryptDataLength;
+
+	KASSERT(nonceLen >= 7 && nonceLen <= 13,
+	    ("nonceLen must be between 7 and 13 bytes"));
+
+	ctx->nonce = nonce;
+	ctx->nonceLength = nonceLen;
+	
+	ctx->authDataCount = 0;
+	ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+	explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+	
+	/*
+	 * Need to determine the L field value.  This is the number of
+	 * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length
+	 * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and
+	 * the nonce.
+	 */
+	L = 15 - nonceLen;
+	
+	flags = ((ctx->authDataLength > 0) << 6) +
+	    (((AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN - 2) / 2) << 3) +
+	    L - 1;
+	/*
+	 * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce,
+	 * and the message length.
+	 */
+	b0[0] = flags;
+	bcopy(nonce, b0 + 1, nonceLen);
+	bp = b0 + 1 + nonceLen;
+
+	/* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of cryptDataLength */
+	for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + sizeof(b0) - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) {
+		*dst = dataLength;
+		dataLength >>= 8;
+	}
+	/* Now need to encrypt b0 */
+	rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, b0, ctx->block);
+	/* If there is auth data, we need to set up the staging block */
+	if (ctx->authDataLength) {
+		size_t addLength;
+		if (ctx->authDataLength < ((1<<16) - (1<<8))) {
+			uint16_t sizeVal = htobe16(ctx->authDataLength);
+			bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block, sizeof(sizeVal));
+			addLength = sizeof(sizeVal);
+		} else if (ctx->authDataLength < (1ULL<<32)) {
+			uint32_t sizeVal = htobe32(ctx->authDataLength);
+			ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
+			ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xfe;
+			bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
+			addLength = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
+		} else {
+			uint64_t sizeVal = htobe64(ctx->authDataLength);
+			ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
+			ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xff;
+			bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
+			addLength = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
+		}
+		ctx->blockIndex = addLength;
+		/*
+		 * The length descriptor goes into the AAD buffer, so we
+		 * need to account for it.
+		 */
+		ctx->authDataLength += addLength;
+		ctx->authDataCount = addLength;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+AES_CBC_MAC_Update(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data,
+    uint16_t length)
+{
+	size_t copy_amt;
+	
+	/*
+	 * This will be called in one of two phases:
+	 * (1)  Applying authentication data, or
+	 * (2)  Applying the payload data.
+	 *
+	 * Because CBC-MAC puts the authentication data size before the
+	 * data, subsequent calls won't be block-size-aligned.  Which
+	 * complicates things a fair bit.
+	 *
+	 * The payload data doesn't have that problem.
+	 */
+				
+	if (ctx->authDataCount < ctx->authDataLength) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to process data as authentication data.
+		 * Since we may be out of sync, we may also need
+		 * to pad out the staging block.
+		 */
+		const uint8_t *ptr = data;
+		while (length > 0) {
+
+			copy_amt = MIN(length,
+			    sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex);
+
+			bcopy(ptr, ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex,
+			    copy_amt);
+			ptr += copy_amt;
+			length -= copy_amt;
+			ctx->authDataCount += copy_amt;
+			ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
+			ctx->blockIndex %= sizeof(ctx->staging_block);
+
+			if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 ||
+			    ctx->authDataCount == ctx->authDataLength) {
+				/*
+				 * We're done with this block, so we
+				 * xor staging_block with block, and then
+				 * encrypt it.
+				 */
+				xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
+				bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+				ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+				if (ctx->authDataCount >= ctx->authDataLength)
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		/*
+		 * We'd like to be able to check length == 0 and return
+		 * here, but the way OCF calls us, length is always
+		 * blksize (16, in this case).  So we have to count on
+		 * the fact that OCF calls us separately for the AAD and
+		 * for the real data.
+		 */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If we're here, then we're encoding payload data.
+	 * This is marginally easier, except that _Update can
+	 * be called with non-aligned update lengths. As a result,
+	 * we still need to use the staging block.
+	 */
+	KASSERT((length + ctx->cryptDataCount) <= ctx->cryptDataLength,
+	    ("More encryption data than allowed"));
+
+	while (length) {
+		uint8_t *ptr;
+		
+		copy_amt = MIN(sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex,
+		    length);
+		ptr = ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex;
+		bcopy(data, ptr, copy_amt);
+		data += copy_amt;
+		ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
+		ctx->cryptDataCount += copy_amt;
+		length -= copy_amt;
+		if (ctx->blockIndex == sizeof(ctx->staging_block)) {
+			/* We've got a full block */
+			xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
+			ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+			bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *buf, struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	uint8_t s0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+	
+	/*
+	 * We first need to check to see if we've got any data
+	 * left over to encrypt.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->blockIndex != 0) {
+		xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
+		ctx->cryptDataCount += ctx->blockIndex;
+		ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+		explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+	}
+	bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
+	s0[0] = (15 - ctx->nonceLength) - 1;
+	bcopy(ctx->nonce, s0 + 1, ctx->nonceLength);
+	rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, s0, s0);
+	for (size_t indx = 0; indx < AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN; indx++)
+		buf[indx] = ctx->block[indx] ^ s0[indx];
+	explicit_bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
+}